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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3423 
___________ 
 
 
ARI WEITZNER; ARI WEITZNER, M.D., P.C., 
Individually and on Behalf 
of All Others Similarly Situated 
 
v. 
 
SANOFI PASTEUR, INC.; VAXSERVE, INC., 
formerly known as Vaccess America, Inc., 
                                                                   Appellants 
 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-02198) 
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
______________ 
 
ARGUED: March 4, 2015 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
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_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 permits defendants 
to serve an offer of judgment on an opposing party. The issue 
in this case, before us on interlocutory appeal from the denial 
of a motion to dismiss, is whether an unaccepted offer of 
judgment under Rule 68, made before a plaintiff files a 
motion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, moots the plaintiff’s entire action, including the 
putative class claims, and thereby deprives a court of federal 
subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez, 136 
S. Ct. 663 (2016), holds that an unaccepted offer does not 
make such a case moot, we will affirm the trial court’s order 
denying defendants’ motion to dismiss.1 
 
I. 
 Ari Weitzner, M.D., is a physician who practices in 
Brooklyn, New York. Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., 7 F. 
Supp. 3d 460, 461 (M.D. Pa. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-
3423 (3d Cir. July 30, 2014). On November 26, 2011, 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and § 1332(d)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b). 
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Weitzner and his professional corporation, Ari Weitzner, 
M.D., P.C., filed a putative class action against Sanofi Pasteur 
Inc. and Vaxserve Inc. Id. Plaintiffs allege that “[b]eginning 
at least as early as April 21, 2004, Defendants transmitted 
more than 10,000 facsimiles to Plaintiffs and the other 
members of the Class . . . without the prior express invitation 
or permission of Plaintiffs and the other members of the 
Class.” J.A. Vol. II at 39a–40a ¶¶ 10, 12. Plaintiffs contend 
these transmissions violate the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227. 
 
 On November 15, 2013—after plaintiffs filed the 
putative class action, and with no motion for class 
certification filed—defendants made offers of judgment under 
Rule 682 to both Weitzner and his professional corporation. 
Weitzner, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 462. In each offer, defendants 
offered: 
 
                                              
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a)–(b) provides: 
At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a 
party defending against a claim may serve on an 
opposing party an offer to allow judgment on 
specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If, 
within 14 days after being served, the opposing 
party serves written notice accepting the offer, 
either party may then file the offer and notice of 
acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk 
must then enter judgment. . . . An unaccepted 
offer is considered withdrawn, but it does not 
preclude a later offer. Evidence of an 
unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a 
proceeding to determine costs.  
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$1,500 for each and every facsimile 
advertisement sent to Plaintiff . . . as alleged in 
Plaintiffs’ complaint . . . and in addition any 
such other relief which is determined by a court 
of competent jurisdiction to be necessary to 
fully satisfy all of the individual claims of 
Plaintiff . . . arising out of or related to the 
transmission of facsimile advertisements sent to 
Plaintiff . . . by or on behalf of Defendants. 
 
Id. at 464. Defendants indicated in each offer that “[t]he 
number of facsimiles sent to Plaintiff . . . is understood to be 
eleven (11) facsimile transmissions.” Id. Defendants also 
offered to pay costs and to stop sending any facsimile 
advertisements in violation of the TCPA. Id. at 464–65. 
Consistent with Rule 68, the offers provided that if the offeree 
“fail[ed] to accept this Offer of Judgment within fourteen (14) 
days as specified in Rule 68, it will be deemed as withdrawn.” 
J.A. Vol. II 100a. 
 
 Defendants contended these offers would “satisfy the 
claims” of the named plaintiffs and “provide [those] 
Plaintiff[s] with the maximum relief available under the law 
to which [those plaintiffs] would be entitled were they to 
prevail in this case.” Id. at 95a-96a. Plaintiffs did not respond 
to the offers. Weitzner, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 462. On December 4, 
2013—more than fourteen days after defendants made their 
offers—defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1), contending their unaccepted offers mooted the case. 
J.A. Vol. II 77a–83a. Plaintiffs still had not moved (and have 
not subsequently moved) for class certification. 
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 On March 12, 2014, the trial judge denied defendants’ 
motion to dismiss. Weitzner, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 460, 461. He 
concluded the offers would provide complete relief to 
plaintiffs in their individual capacities. Id. at 465. But 
following Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 
2004), he held plaintiffs’ action could proceed because they 
had not engaged in “undue delay” in failing to file their 
motion for class certification and a successful class 
certification motion would “‘relate . . . back to the filing of 
the class complaint.’” Weitzner, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 465 (quoting 
Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348). Accordingly, the trial judge held, 
“‘[b]y relating class certification back to the filing of a class 
complaint, the class representative would retain standing to 
litigate class certification though his individual claim is 
moot.’” Id. (quoting Weiss, 385 F.3d at 348). The trial judge 
also rejected defendants’ argument that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 
1523 (2013), undermined Weiss, “given the fact that Weiss 
concerned a putative Rule 23 class action and Genesis 
Healthcare involved a [Fair Labor Standards Act] action.” 
Weitzner, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 467. 
 
 Subsequently, defendants moved to certify the trial 
judge’s order for interlocutory appeal. Weitzner v. Sanofi 
Pasteur, Inc., No. 3:11–cv–2198, 2014 WL 1786500, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. May 5, 2014). The trial judge certified his order 
denying defendants’ motion to dismiss so we could review 
the following question: 
 
Whether an unaccepted offer of judgment under 
Rule 68 in a putative class action, when the 
offer is made before the plaintiff files a motion 
for class certification pursuant to Rule 23, 
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moots the plaintiff’s entire action including the 
putative class claims, and thereby deprives the 
court of federal subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
Id.3  
II. 
 We exercise plenary review over whether subject-
matter jurisdiction exists. Tellado v. IndyMac Mortg. Servs., 
707 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2013). We also exercise plenary 
review over a trial court’s ruling on mootness. Burkey v. 
Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
III. 
 Campbell-Ewald involved a class action filed by Jose 
Gomez, alleging the Campbell-Ewald Company, an 
advertising and marketing communications agency, violated 
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by using an 
automatic dialing system to send text messages to cellular 
telephones without the recipients’ prior express consent. 136 
S. Ct. at 666–67. Campbell-Ewald filed an offer of judgment 
under Rule 68 in an attempt to settle Gomez’s individual 
claim. Id. at 667. After Gomez did not accept the settlement 
offer and allowed Campbell-Ewald’s Rule 68 submission to 
lapse after the fourteen days specified in the Rule, Campbell-
                                              
3 On July 17, 2014, we granted defendants’ petition for leave 
to bring their interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
J.A. Vol. I 1a. We held the case c.a.v. pending the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez, 136 
S. Ct. 663 (2016), which was issued on January 20, 2016. 
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Ewald moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), contending the 
unaccepted offer made the case moot. Id. at 668. 
 
 The Court held “an unaccepted offer to satisfy [a] 
named plaintiff’s individual claim [is not] sufficient to render 
a case moot when the complaint seeks relief on behalf of the 
plaintiff and a class of persons similarly situated.” Id. at 666. 
It further stated that “in accord with Rule 68 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure . . . an unaccepted settlement offer 
has no force.” Id.4  
 
 These holdings resolve the question presented to us on 
interlocutory review. Because an unaccepted settlement offer 
“has no force,” it moots neither Plaintiffs’ individual claims 
nor the case as a whole. 
 
 Campbell-Ewald overrules our previous holding in 
Weiss that “[a]n offer of complete relief will generally moot 
the plaintiff’s claim, as at that point the plaintiff retains no 
personal interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Weiss, 385 
F.3d at 340. Beyond this, we decline to elaborate on the 
implications of Campbell-Ewald on our other holdings in 
Weiss. Nothing in this opinion should be taken to express a 
                                              
4 The Court declined to consider “whether the result would be 
different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the 
plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the 
plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff 
in that amount.” Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. at 672. It also 
declined to consider “whether Gomez’s [putative] claim for 
class relief prevent[ed] th[e] case from becoming moot.” Id. 
at 679 n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Like the Court, we will 
not address these issues. 
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view on any issues decided by the trial judge other than the 
single issue certified on interlocutory appeal. 
 
IV. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court’s order 
denying defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
